Appellant, Wells Fargo Bank, NA (” Wells Fargo”), the Plaintiff in this
foreclosure action, seeks reversal of the trial court’s order denying its
requests to: (a) approve a dismissal of the case; (b) set aside the
previously entered final judgment; (c) cancel the notice of lis pendens;
and (d) direct the clerk to return the original loan documents upon which
the foreclosure action was based. Wells Fargo sought this relief because
on the eve of the foreclosure sale the pro se defendant, Michael J. Giglio
(” Giglio”) delivered — and Wells Fargo accepted — funds sufficient to
reinstate the mortgage, thereby obviating the need to sell the collateral or
continue with the litigation.1 Put simply, Giglio cured the default and
the parties settled their dispute, an outcome the law favors. See, e.g.,
Sun Microsystems of Cal., Inc. v. Eng’g and Mfg. Sys., C.A., 682 So. 2d
219, 220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (” The public policy of the State of Florida, as
articulate d in numerous court decisions, highly favors settlement
agreements among parties and will enforce them whenever possible.”).
We hold that the trial court, having vacated the foreclosure sale,
abused its discretion in refusing to grant the related collateral relief
requested b y Wells Fargo, which refusal prevented the parties from
concluding their settlement. See Toler, 78 So. 3d at 701 (” An order
denying a motion for relief from judgment is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.”). The trial court clearly had jurisdiction to consider Wells
Fargo’s Rule 1.540(b)(5) motion; and in light of the parties’ settlement —
a result the law seeks to encourage — the relief requested should have
been granted. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lupica, 36 So. 3d 875 (Fla.
5th DCA 2010)
